About Norms and Causes by Kayser, Daniel & Nouioua, Farid
About Norms and Causes
Daniel Kayser, Farid Nouioua
To cite this version:
Daniel Kayser, Farid Nouioua. About Norms and Causes. International Journal on Artificial
Intelligence Tools, World Scientific Publishing, 2005, 14(1-2), pp.7-23. <hal-00085144>
HAL Id: hal-00085144
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00085144
Submitted on 11 Jul 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
February 25, 2005 20:8 WSPC/INSTRUCTION FILE IjaitKayserNoui
International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools
c© World Scientific Publishing Company
About Norms and Causes
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Knowing the norms of a domain is crucial, but there exists no repository of norms. We
propose a method to extract them from texts: narrative texts generally do not describe a
norm, but rather the discrepancies between what actually happened, and the correspond-
ing normal sequence of events. Answers about the causes of an event often reveal the
implicit norms. We apply this idea to the domain of driving, and validate it by designing
algorithms that identify, in a text, the ”basic” norms to which it refers implicitly.
Keywords: Norms; Nonmonotonic Logic; Causal Reasoning, Natural Language Semantics
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Artificial Intelligence is both a Science and a Technique. As a technique, its achieve-
ments and its limits are well known and well documented. As a Science, it plays
an active role, together with other disciplines belonging to what is now known as
cognitive studies , to shed new light on issues that had long been debated: many
questions traditionally considered as pertaining to Philosophy, such as the idealiza-
tion of rational thinking by various kinds of logic, the distinction between word and
concept, the notions of meaning, knowledge, and even consciousness, have changed
status and are now hot scientific topics.
Among the most original developments due to A.I., restoring to favor the notion
of exception in Science should not be played down. The idea of a theory admitting
exceptions was long scorned (even by A.I. insiders! see e.g.3), because it was allegedly
irrefutable: if an experiment confirms the theory, that is fine with it; and if it does
not, just add one new exception to the theory and keep it!
Rejecting exceptions forced to elaborate a high standard of demand on scientific
theories. This was, and still is, an excellent incentive in ’hard’ Sciences, but it may
have pushed some human sciences towards dead ends.
In the vast majority of everyday situations, humans do not act as scientists!
They have to reach quickly a decision, on the basis of incomplete or uncertain
information, and with a partial knowledge of the domain concerned. Achieving such
a feat hundreds of times a day is impossible, for complexity reasons, if knowledge is
1
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stored and used as a list of truth-preserving rules. To make it possible, knowledge
must be structured as simple general rules with exceptions.
A.I. has developed a sub-field, Knowledge Representation, to study a number
of techniques that enable computers to reason under the same constraints of in-
completeness, and the same requirement of speed as humans do: the best attempts
are semantic networks with exceptions9, non-monotonic logics1, connectionism21,
inheritance schemes10. This endeavor has shown, among other things, that there is
a scientific way of handling exceptions: criteria such as parsimony in the coding of
knowledge, or algorithmic complexity in the derivation of the most useful results4
do justify the use of exceptions, without justifying whatever theory you have in
mind.
But this (re)discovery of the role of exceptions leads to an interesting engineering
challenge: for a given domain, what are the general rules, and how do exceptional
situations affect them? Structuring our everyday knowledge in terms of usual and
exceptional factors is a point of paramount importance. As the scientific investi-
gation is more accustomed to look for every factor of influence than to elaborate
priorities among them, we need to develop a methodology in order to bring out a
hierarchy with, at one end, important factors playing a role of full member in a rule,
and at the other end, subsidiary factors to be considered only in exceptional cases.
This is the reason why eliciting the norms of a domain is important.
1.2. Plan of the paper
This paper presents a methodology to extract norms from texts concerning a specific
domain. We cannot expect to do so from an automatic examination of the texts: as
every reader knows them, the norms are never spelled out. However, it has often
been noticed that many texts, mostly narratives, describe the discrepancies between
what actually happened, and the corresponding normal sequence of events. This is
of course not enough to infer the norm from the text. After a short discussion on
the notion of norm (section 2), we introduce in section 3 the idea consisting in using
causation as leverage to find the norms.
Section 4 describes the method. Section 5 presents a reified first-order logic to
cope with the problem of time and modalities. Section 6 illustrates the whole process
with examples.
2. About Norms
2.1. Polysemy of “ norm”
The word “norm” refers to at least two different ideas: one is prescriptive; the
adjective corresponding to it in this case is “normative”; the other is descriptive,
and the corresponding adjective is “normal”. The majority of A.I. works about
norms use the first sense of the word2,8 and concern various kinds of deontic logic16.
However, the interest that we have in norms is motivated by the second sense: we
want to describe what is said to be normal.
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Notice that other (intermediate?) senses also exist: for instance, a norm can be
an idealization of a practice, without being a prescription; in this sense, formal logic
can be looked at as the norm of human reasoning: it is not descriptive; calling it a
norm is not claiming that normal humans follow logical patterns of reasoning; but
it is not truly prescriptive either: not following these patterns is not considered as
ill mannered, and it has no judicial consequences!
2.2. Knowing what is normal
The importance of knowing what is normal emerged progressively in various sub-
fields of A.I.:
(1) knowing what will normally happen after an action is vital for predicting and
planning;
(2) in the reverse direction, this knowledge is necessary to diagnose which action
may have caused a given state-of-affairs;
(3) it has often been pointed out that text understanding presupposes from the
reader a knowledge of the norms; hence, it is very rare to find a text spelling
out the norms, and it is much more frequent to describe a situation or an
unfolding of events by its deviations from the underlying implicit norm.
Point 3., the needs related to text understanding, has led early A.I. researchers
like5 to focus on the representation of normal uses of objects and normal courses
of events, and the first proposed tools to solve this kind of problems were frames17
and scripts22. Capturing the ability to derive conclusions that normally follow from
premises has later been the major incentive for developing, in the 1980’s, non-
monotonic logics. There is no need to remind the importance for A.I. of the devel-
opments of this topic.
2.3. Truth-based vs. Norm-based inferences in Natural Language
Traditional NL semantics focuses on truth conditions. A text is said to entail the
propositions that hold true whenever the conditions making the text true are ful-
filled. This is a very weak notion of entailment. Consider for example:
(R) I was driving on Main Street when a truck before me braked suddenly.
The truth-based entailments of (R) contain propositions like: “there exists a
time t such that I was driving at t, and there was a truck T before me at t, and T
braked at t.”
The norm-based entailments contain e.g.: “Both T and me were moving in the
same direction with no other vehicle in between. The distance between us was less
than 100 meters.”
Of course, the propositions of the latter list might be false while those of the
former list are necessarily true if (R) is correct. Nonetheless:
• every reader of (R) will take them, at least provisionally, as legitimate inferences,
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• the author of (R) knows that explicit indications should be provided somewhere
in the text, in order to block these inferences, if they are incorrect.
Norm-based inferences are thus as rightful and much richer than truth-based ones.
According to the usual tripartition between syntax, semantics and pragmatics, they
might be classified under pragmatics rather than under semantics, but no matter
the label, they are extremely important. The problem is how to find the norms
enabling to derive them.
2.4. How to find the norms?
There is no repository of norms ruling a given domain (norm is taken here in the
sense corresponding to ’normal’, not ’normative’). A somehow similar problem arises
in other areas of Knowledge Representation. In both cases, there exist good frame-
works (non-monotonic logics, description logics, and so on), but filling the framework
with actual data is a difficult task (e.g. the CYC project13).
The data one can start with, in both cases, is the huge amount of textual data
now available under electronic form. But the problem is easier when the goal is to
elicit so-called ontologies from such texts. Kind-of and part-of hierarchies, which
are the critical ingredients of an ontology, are more or less explicitly present in
dictionaries, thesauri, glossaries, etc. There is no such starting point in the case of
norms.
3. About Causes
3.1. Is there a definition of cause?
The notion of cause is deeply rooted in human cognition, and there is an abundant
literature witnessing the fact that it has been a focus of interest at all times. Yet,
strangely enough, there is very little consensus about the nature of causation. Some
philosophers consider it to be a “real”feature of the world11: according to this point
of view, A intrinsically causes B, no matter what humans think about it; others
consider it as a psychological notion invented by humans to make sense of their
observations of the world, the world in itself having nothing causal (this was the
point of view developed for instance by Bertrand Russell; see discussion e.g. in19).
Our discipline, A.I., has not to take side in the metaphysical issue as to whether
causes and effects “really” exist. But it has to give an account of an ubiquitous kind
of reasoning: causal reasoning, because it is uncontroversially very useful: building
systems for planning, diagnosing or predicting, i.e. for the most useful A.I. applica-
tions, is absolutely impossible without reasoning on causes and effects.
In the kind of applications that A.I. has to care for, what is worth being con-
sidered as a cause must be something we can act upon. Gravitation may well be a
cause of a glass being broken; it leads nowhere to blame gravitation for the damage
that happened; finding who struck the glass is a more useful move! But filtering the
potentially endless list of factors that can be considered as having caused a given
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fact, by requiring that we must be able to act on them, is not enough. The list
remains too large to be of practical use. Now, in a given context, only few causes
come to the mind. Mackie’s well-known example14 of an explosion happening when
a cigarette is lit is revealing: if someone is asked for the cause and knows that the
event took place at home, a sensible answer can be: “perhaps, the gas was leaking”;
if it took place in an oil refinery, the answer should be: “smoking in such places
causes explosions”.
3.2. Relation between cause and norm
The above example shows that, even if it does not seem so at first sight, the notions
of cause and norm are tightly related. As a matter of fact, the reason why the
answer differs at home and in a refinery, is that the norms ruling the behavior at
home and in a refinery are different. More generally, it seems that the best answer to
a causal question concerning abnormal events (“why did this happen”), is to point
to a violated norm.
Hence one of the main ideas developed in this paper, is that a good methodology
to elicit the norms of a given domain consists in analyzing the answers to questions
concerning the cause of abnormal events.
If we are told that, after skidding on bits of gravel in a bend of a highway,
a motorcycle went off the road, the reasons that come to mind to explain the
accident are the presumably excessive speed of the motorcyclist in the bend, and
the unexpected presence of gravel on the road, i.e. two abnormal factors on which
one can rather easily act. No one would call a cause of the accident the presence of
gas in the tank of the motorcycle, because this is normal, nor would one blame the
centrifugal force, because no action can prevent it to exert its effect.
Many other examples (see below) confirm the tendency to ascribe the cause of
an abnormal event, e.g. an accident, to an abnormal factor on which a voluntary
action could in principle remedy. Therefore, the capacity to find the same causes
as a human reader is a good criterion to check whether the set of norms of a given
domain is mastered.
4. Method
4.1. The corpus
The domain we selected concerns car accidents, because:
• we have already studied, for different reasons, a corpus of car crash reports
written by drivers after an accident23; the reports are short texts, syntactically
simple, and (unfortunately) we can get as many of them as we wish from French
insurance companies;
• they describe abnormal events occurring in a domain that is non-trivial, but
limited well enough to make plausible an enumeration of all of its norms;
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• hey are good representatives of texts requiring the reader to perform norm-based
inferences in order to understand what happened.
These texts have however a disadvantage: they are often biased. The author
tends to describe the accident from the point of view that minimizes his/her re-
sponsibility. But this is not a real drawback: the norms that are important are
those which the drivers have in mind, not the set of norms that govern the real
events, and these norms are revealed by biased descriptions as well. Anyway no
corpus can pretend to contain unbiased descriptions of events.
4.2. General idea
In order to study the relationships between norms and causes within the limited
domain of car-crash reports, we gathered a sample of these reports and determined,
in each case, what we considered to be the cause of the accident. The problem then
consists in designing algorithms that copy this behavior. If the algorithm also cor-
rectly identifies the cause of the accident in reports taken from outside the sample,
this will mean that the set of norms collected is reasonably complete, and it will
validate our approach.
This is a hard problem, involving linguistic and knowledge representation issues,
as well as reasoning mechanisms.
Linguistic issues are so difficult that, by themselves, they would justify a full
project. Some of the difficulties have already been identified in a previous work on
the same corpus23. Nonetheless, the risk is high of being stuck in nearly insoluble
linguistic problems, without ever knowing whether their resolution matters for our
purpose. Therefore, instead of going “forward” from the text to the norms, we
started “backwards”: we assumed the earlier stages to be solved, and concentrate
on the last ones. This method secures that we focus only on issues that are necessary.
4.3. Basic and Derived Anomalies
The violation of the well-known norm:
(N1) “Under all circumstances, one must have control over one’s vehicle.”
can explain almost every accident. However, in a text like:
In order to avoid a child suddenly rushing on the street, I swerved and
bumped into a parked vehicle.
identifying the cause of the accident as a mere “loss of control” would be misleading.
As a matter of fact, the violation of (N1) is here a consequence of a more imperative
norm:
(N2) “Harming a person must be avoided.”
Accordingly, “because the driver swerved to avoid the child” is a better explanation
of the accident. As accidents are anomalies, we want to trace back their causes to
an anomaly; obeying (N2) being a normal behavior, we further identify the norm:
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(N3) “Persons must not rush on causeways.”
and prefer to ascribe the cause of the accident to the violation of (N3). Notice that
this is not the only possible cause: in a densely populated area, the norm is to drive
slowly, and it could be argued that the violation of this norm is a better explanation.
In either case, the tendency is confirmed: we take as a cause the deliberate violation
of a norm, when such a norm comes to our mind.
We sorted out, for each car-crash report of the corpus, what seemed to be the
“basic” cause of the accident. This work is delicate. The aim is to extract what
a normal reader understands from the circumstances related, but, as we said, the
description is often biased, and a normal reader knows that it can be so; therefore,
understanding the report does not entail to take every statement of it for the pure
truth. Sometimes, the writer’s argumentation is so obviously a purely rhetorical
game, that the reader is implicitly driven to understand it as an admission of re-
sponsibility. A difficult part of the work is thus to determine up to which point the
meaning intended by the writer deviates from the literal meaning of his/her text.
Anyhow, the set of causes considered basic, after all the texts have been manually
processed, reveals a rather comprehensive subset of the norms of the domain.
4.4. Layers
Our problem is to handle the transition from the hundreds of relevant propositions
found in the texts, towards an expected small number of norms. It would be foolish
to attempt solving it in one single step. We therefore split the problem in layers: the
most external one is the mere result of a parser, filtered from the irrelevant elements
of the reports. The most internal one, layer 1 also called the “kernel”, consists in a
very small number of predicates (see Appendix).
Hypothesis H1 : All the “basic” anomalies can be explained by means of the predi-
cates of the kernel.
Furthermore, we assume that the representation of the text at layer n can be
obtained from its representation at layers n′ > n by means of a limited number of
inference rules, each one factoring out the common features that govern a specific
concern. The whole process is thus a stepwise convergence from a vast variety of
situations towards a smaller number of cases.
We consider two groups of layers, roughly described as the linguistic group and
the conceptual group.
The linguistic group starts from the result of the parser, i.e. a set of syntactic
predicates expressing the grammatical relations between words. It translates this
set, through several steps, into a set of predications involving a pre-defined list
of semantic predicates. One step consists in using equivalence tables to replace
by a single representative a variety of words having roughly the same meaning in
the context of road accidents; another step concerns the resolution of anaphoric
co-references; determining the semantic relationships between the elements of a
sentence: they do not result immediately from the syntax.
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For example, in le ve´hicule A est venu heurter le ve´hicule B (lit. vehicle
A has come to hit vehicle B), A is the grammatical subject of come; B is the object
of hit. Now, the sentence actually means that vehicle A hit vehicle B, i.e. vehicles
A and B are semantically connected as being the respective subject and object of
the same verb to hit ; the verb to come is only used here as a “support”.
At the end of this process, the text is transformed into a conjunction of literals
expressed with predicates taken from a list of around 60 semantic predicates. The
next stages use the conceptual group of layers, and this process is developed in the
rest of the paper.
As said above, the goal is to convert progressively this conjunction into a con-
junction of literals of the kernel, from which, according to (H1), the basic anomaly,
i.e. the answer to the question “why did the accident happen”, can be discovered.
5. Time, modalities, and inference
5.1. Different times involved
An important open issue is the connection between the grammatical tenses, found
in the text, and the phenomenal time6. But in order to find a satisfactory solution,
we must first determine precisely what time needs be represented, as several times
play a role in our problem:
(i) the (linear) time of the reader: propositions in the text are ordered, but this
order does not necessarily reflect the sequence of the events accounted for;
(ii) the (linear) time of the events;
(iii) he (branching) time considered by the agents: each agent indeed knows that
only one future will come true, but his/her actions are explainable only by con-
sidering the possibility of several of them, among which (s)he tries to eliminate
the undesirable ones.
Hypothesis H2: Our goal requires only the explicit representation of (ii).
H2 is a rather strong hypothesis, since our texts abound with lexical items like
“avoid”, “prepare”, “expect” (and their negation) that evoke unrealized futures.
However, the author generally makes use of them for argumentation purposes, which
provide no significant help in finding the causes of the accident.
Notice that the hypothesis does not consider the unrealized futures as of no
import, but only that these futures do not need explicit representation.
5.2. About anomalies
Hypothesis H3 : The basic anomalies are of two kinds; either an agent had to do
some action a, had the ability to do a, and did not a; or an external factor that
could not reasonably be foreseen explains the accident. The derived anomalies are
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those where an agent should have done an action a, but, due to a basic anomaly,
was not in position to do it.
According to H3, we need to reason on propositions of the form: MUST-DO a
and ABLE-TO-DO a. They look like modals, and indeed they are; the former is
clearly a kind of necessity, and the latter, a kind of possibility, but they do not
obey the usual duality relationship. For one thing, an agent must not do ¬a every
time (s)he is not able to do a. We develop this issue in more details in the next
paragraph.
5.3. States and accessibility between states
A modal account of the duties and abilities of agents can be given by means of a
possible world semantics. The accessibility between states has clearly a temporal
flavor. Yet, representing every time point of a sequence of events is unnecessary;
in fact, the reports look like a sequence of pictures, rather than like a film, but
this metaphor is not fully adequate, since the ”pictures” may use predicates that
are dynamic in nature. So, a state is not characterized by the propositions which
are true at a given time point, but rather by those remaining true during a given
interval.
The problem is to determine the intervals. Basically, the idea is to consider an
interval as a kripkean world satisfying a predicate of action as well as its relevant
effects (ramifications); the accessibility from a world w to another one w’ is the
result of one of the two following possibilities:
• an agent has decided in w to perform an action; in that case, there exists
accessible worlds w’ containing its possible outcomes; for example, if the agent
decides to brake in w, then w’ contains the braking action and either the fact
that the speed is low, or that the vehicle stopped. The corresponding transitions
are called C-accessibilities;
• an external event, or an involuntary action happened in w; for instance, driving
on an icy patch in w leads to a world w’ where the control of the vehicle is lost;
these transitions are called E-accessibilities.
A subset of the C-accessibilities, named the D-accessibilities, gathers the transi-
tions where the agents perform the actions dictated by their duties. The modality
MUST −DO is thus the necessity modality associated, in a kripkean sense, to the
D-accessibilities, while the modality ABLE − TO−DO is the possibility modality
associated with the C-accessibilities. This explains why they are not dual to each
other in the usual sense.
A world, or state, corresponds to an interval in which no change in modality
occurs, i.e. what the agent MUST − DO and is ABLE − TO − DO remains the
same. On the contrary, the decision of an agent to do (or not to do) an action takes
place in a state that strictly precedes the state where the action is performed.
It ensues that anomalies are found in transitions, not in states. As the usual syn-
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tax of modal logics is not well adapted to assert statements about transitions, we find
more convenient to represent modalities as first-order predicates in a reified logic.
Briefly stated, the reification of a logical language L is a language RL where formulas
such as P (x, y) in L are written HOLDS(P, x, y) in RL. This has the advantages
of allowing to quantify over the predicate names without using higher-order logic,
and to consider ordinary statements, of the form HOLDS(predicate-name, agent-
name, state), on a par with modal statements, e.g. MUST −DO(predicate-name,
agent-name, state). Of course, the expressive power of a reified language remains
within the limits of expressiveness of first-order logic, so it is impossible to quantify
over the set of all predicates; but it is possible to consider some predicates as being
objects (hence the name, reification); these objects form a subset of the domain, so
one can quantify over this subset, and this is what is needed in practical applica-
tions. There is a price to pay: to represent the negation of P , we have to introduce
a constant not− P and to explicit obvious facts:
(NEG) (∀ P, x, y) HOLDS (P, x, y) ↔ ¬HOLDS (not− P, x, y)
which are given for free in usual logic. Practically, this constraint is not very cumber-
some. It would be more tedious if we had to reason on conjunctions or disjunctions,
e.g. HOLDS(P − and−Q, x, y). We never met such needs.
For instance, the two formats of H3 are expressed by the formulas (p is the
name of a predicate, Ag, the name of an agent, B-An stands for Basic-Anomaly):
(F ) (∀ p, Ag, t) MUST −DO (p, Ag, t) ∧ ABLE − TO −DO (p, Ag, t) ∧
¬HOLDS (p, Ag, t + 1) → B −An
(F ′) (∀ p, Ag, t) ABNORMAL− PERTURBATION (p, Ag, t) → B −An
Whereas in most cases several accessible (future) states are meaningful, H2 says
that only members of a totally ordered sequence need actually be present to reveal
the basic anomalies. States are thus represented as integers, yielding a simplified
version of the notion of chronicle 15.
In order to represent a scriptal unfolding of events, we introduce a third modality,
NORMALLY. It corresponds to a necessity, in the kripkean sense, with regard to
a subset N of the union of C and E-accessibilities. A state is N-accessible if it
corresponds to an expected outcome of the current situation (for example, in C:
when a driver arrives at a stop sign, s/he is expected to stop; in E: if a traffic light
is red, it is expected to turn green). As agents are expected to comply with their
duties, D is a subset of N ∩ C.
In our language, this modality is expressed by a pseudo-modal predicate:
NORMALLY (p, Ag, t). The fact that D is a subset of N is thus written:
(D) (∀ p, Ag, t) MUST −DO (p, Ag, t) → NORMALLY (p, Ag, t)
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5.4. Inference rules
Introducing “normal” transitions naturally leads to using non-monotonic inference
rules. We use a fragment of Reiter’s default rules 20. This choice is motivated by
reasons of clarity, but as defaults easily translate into auto-epistemic logic 7,12, we
can take advantage of several existing deductive systems. We write A : B and
A : B[C] as shorthands for respectively the normal default A : B
B
and the semi-
normal default A : (B ∧ C)
B
.
The basic default rule is:
(N) NORMALLY (p, Ag, t) : HOLDS (p, Ag, t + 1)
i.e. the transitions (t, t + 1) in the actual unfolding of states are normal ones. Of
course, since our texts report on accidents, there must be at least one exception,
i.e. one actual transition that is abnormal.
In order to avoid an uncontrolled proliferation in the number of extensions, we
appeal to defaults only when we have strong reasons to believe that a report could
imply an exception to the rule we are expressing. In all other cases, even when
exceptions are conceivable, we use material implications.
As an example, consider the following rule, which captures an abductive reason-
ing:
HOLDS (Same File, Ag, Ag′, t) ∧ HOLDS (Crash, Ag, Ag′, t) :
HOLDS (Is follower, Ag′, Ag, t− 1)
(if Ag′ bumps into Ag while both of them are in the same file, it is most likely
that Ag′ was the follower of Ag in that file). We use a default here because, al-
though we do not have the case in our sample, it is not implausible that Ag’ hit Ag
at the end of overtaking Ag’s follower; we hypothesize that in this case, the report
would give enough elements to derive ¬HOLDS (Is follower, Ag′, Ag, t − 1),
thereby preventing the application of the rule.
The reader probably notices that HOLDS gets a varying arity (3 or
4). This is clearly forbidden in first-order logic. We present it that way
for clarity [actually HOLDS is ternary and, when needed, a binary func-
tion combines together the extra-arguments. The actual expression is thus:
HOLDS (COMBINE (Same File, Ag), Ag′, t)]. The same trick is used for
the pseudo-modal predicates.
The inference engine uses both “strict” rules (like (D) above) and ”default”
rules (like (N)); it stops as soon as one of the rules (F ) or (F ′) produces the atom
B −An (basic-anomaly).
6. Examples
Space limitations prevent us from showing but very simple examples. A significant
minority of reports have this level of simplicity, but a majority of them are far more
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complex.
6.1. Text B21
Our first example is text B21 of our corpus:
Nous nous sommes arreˆte´s pour laisser passer un ve´hicule de pompiers,
la voiture qui nous suivait nous a alors heurte´s.
We stopped to let a vehicle of firemen through; the car following us
then bumped on us.
Assuming as said above, that the linguistic issues are correctly handled, we start
with three states 0, 1 and 2; the initial state 0 is by default a state where all vehicles
are under control.
State # 1.
HOLDS (Stopped, A, 1); the reason given to this event, the firemen, is purely
contextual: we thus omit it.
State # 2.
HOLDS (Crash, A, B, 2) HOLDS(Is follower, B, A, 2).
Inferences
Some predicates are declared static, and are endowed with forward default per-
sistence, i.e.
(S) STATIC (p) ∧ HOLDS (p, Ag, t) : HOLDS (p, Ag, t + 1)
This assumption is usual15. Here, and in several other texts, we need also a kind
of abductive reasoning entailing backward persistence. Being static is not enough
for being backward persistent, so we declare which predicates have this feature on
a case-by-case basis. Here, we do have:
HOLDS (Is follower, Ag, Ag′, t) : HOLDS (Is follower, Ag, Ag′, t− 1)
his default yields: HOLDS (Is follower, B, A, 1). Another rule (a strict one)
tells:
(Cr) (∀ Ag, Ag′, t) HOLDS (Crash, Ag, Ag′, t) → ¬HOLDS (Stopped, Ag′, t)
(for an agent Ag′ to bump into Ag at time t requires that Ag′ is not stopped at
time t).
We thus get: ¬HOLDS(Stopped, B, 2).
Norm (N1) (see {}4.3.) translates into the rule:
(∀ Ag, t) MUST −DO (Control, Ag, t)
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Therefore, MUST −DO (Control, B, 0) from which (D) and (N), with t = 0,
give: HOLDS (Control, B, 1).
We also have:
HOLDS (Is follower, Ag′, Ag, t) ∧ HOLDS (Stopped, Ag, t) :
MUST −DO (Stopped, Ag′, t) [HOLDS (Control, Ag′, t)]
which means that if Ag′ follows Ag, and Ag stops, then Ag′ must stop too, un-
less Ag′ is not under control.
This rule provides: MUST −DO (Stopped, B, 1). Finally,
(∀ Ag, t) HOLDS (Control, Ag, t) → ABLE − TO −DO (Stopped, Ag, t)
i.e. for a vehicle, being under control implies being able to stop. This rule gives us:
ABLE − TO − DO (Stopped, B, 1) which completes the premises of (F ) (5.3.)
with p = Stopped, Ag = B, t = 1, and allows to derive B −An.
This derivation stops the process. We can answer the question “Why did the
accident happen?” and the answer, provided a simple NL generator is written, is:
“because vehicle B did not stop at state 2”.
6.2. Text B7
Les deux ve´hicules e´taient en stationnement perpendiculairement. En
l’absence des conducteurs, le frein du ve´hicule B a laˆche´. Entraˆıne´ par
la pente, le ve´hicule B a traverse´ la chausse´e et a heurte´ le ve´hicule A.
The two vehicles were parked perpendicularly. In the absence of the
drivers, the brake of vehicle B released. Because of the slope, vehicle B
crossed the street and bumped into vehicle A.
Here, the text is decomposed in three states:
State # 0.
The default state 0 does not apply here, since two vehicles are parked and the
drivers are absent. We have:
HOLDS (Parked, A, 0) HOLDS (Parked, B, 0)
¬HOLDS (With Driver, A, 0) ¬HOLDS (With Driver, B, 0)
State # 1.
The brake of vehicle B releases; this event is considered punctual, and the state
contains the consequence of the event, i.e. vehicle B is no more at rest.
HOLDS (Abnormal Brake, B, 1) ¬HOLDS (Stopped, B, 1)
State # 2.
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This is the state where B hits A.
HOLDS (Crash, A, B, 2)
Inferences
We first apply the rule:
(∀ Ag, t) HOLDS (Parked, Ag, t) → HOLDS (Stopped, Ag, t)
(A parked vehicle is stopped), and obtain:
HOLDS (Stopped, A, 0) HOLDS (Stopped, B, 0).
Parked is forward-persistent, i.e. we have STATIC (Parked), hence through (S):
HOLDS (Parked, A, 1) HOLDS (Parked, A, 2).
HOLDS (Stopped, A, 1) HOLDS (Stopped, A, 2).
The default (S) is blocked for B, as we have:
¬HOLDS (Stopped, B, 1) and by contraposition ¬HOLDS (Parked, B, 1)
Moving (i.e. not being stopped) is also forward persistent: STATIC (not −
Stopped). From (NEG) and ¬HOLDS (Stopped, B, 1) we derive HOLDS (not−
Stopped, B, 1) and through (S) and (NEG) again: ¬HOLDS (Stopped, B, 2)
Incidentally, the same literal is produced by another way: the rule (Cr) of ex-
ample 6.1.
We apply now the following rule:
(∀ Ag, t) HOLDS (Abnormal Brake, Ag, t) ∧ ¬HOLDS (Stopped, Ag, t) →
¬HOLDS (Control, Ag, t) ∧ ¬ABLE − TO −DO (Control, Ag, t− 1)
(if the brake of a vehicle is abnormal at a state t where the vehicle is moving -
the vehicle may have been at rest or not at state t−1-, then the vehicle is no longer
controlled at state t and the driver was not in position at state t−1 to keep control
over it, because the problems with the brakes are considered to be unpredictable).
This rule yields here:
¬HOLDS (Control, B, 1) ¬ABLE − TO −DO (Control, B, 0).
This last fact prevents (F ) from firing: as B was not in position to control, his
lack of control is not the basic anomaly. As a matter of fact, we are in presence of
what we called (5.2.) a derived anomaly. But we also have the rule:
(∀ Ag, t) HOLDS (Abnormal Brake, Ag, t) ∧ ¬HOLDS (Stopped, Ag, t) →
ABNORMAL− PERTURBATION (Brake, Ag, t)
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that expresses the fact that an abnormal brake in a moving vehicle is
to be considered as a major perturbation. We thus have: ABNORMAL −
PERTURBATION (Brake, B, 1) and, through (F ′), we derive the basic anomaly.
The cause of the accident is thus taken here to be an external, unpredictable, event:
the brake of vehicle B had an anomaly.
Several other derived anomalies are also discovered; for instance we have
a rule expressing that if a collision happened between two vehicles, each of
them constitutes an obstacle for the other. Moreover, except under some spe-
cific conditions, when a vehicle has an obstacle, it must stop. This allows to
derive MUST − DO (Stopped, B, 1); as we derived (by two different paths)
¬HOLDS (Stopped, B, 2), (F ) has interesting premises for detecting a basic
anomaly; but, since B is not under control at state 1, we also have ¬ABLE −
TO − DO (Stopped, B, 1). Therefore (F ) cannot fire and this is only a derived
anomaly.
7. Perspectives and conclusion
7.1. Current state and short-term perspective
We have analyzed by hand a set of 73 reports. In each case, we have identified
the basic anomaly and the sequence of states that corresponds to the unfolding
described by the report.
We have written 74 rules and defaults to handle what we call layers 1 and
2. The linguistic group of layers is well advanced, and most rules of layer 3 are
already written too. Analyzing new texts will certainly show the need for new rules,
or for generalizing the existing ones, but we are fairly confident that the size of
the whole enterprise remains manageable: at worst, a few hundreds of rules should
be necessary. We intend to complete shortly the other layers, and to validate the
approach by testing them on fresh reports.
Several taggers and parsers are available for French, we tested a tagger and the
results were quite satisfactory; the specificities of the reports -as well as the state
of the art for general-purpose parsers- are such that the parses we obtain are less
suitable. We therefore developed our own parser, which fares better on the corpus,
but its scaling up to the new reports remains to be assessed.
he derivations are currently performed by hand. There exist a number of de-
duction engines working with various subsets of non-monotonic logics. We plan to
switch in the near future from manual to automatic deductions.
If, at this stage, everything works correctly, we will consider that the norms of
the domain are suitably represented by the default rules and by some strict rules,
since as we said, we appeal to defaults not if exceptions are conceivable, but only
when exceptional cases are likely to be present in a report. This set is obtained
entirely from our intuition, and the only help provided by the computer is to check,
a posteriori, that it is reasonably complete; it is the case if the computer derives
from a report the same cause of the accident as a human reader.
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7.2. Longer term perspective and conclusion
As a further step of the study, it would be interesting to propose automatically
one or more new norms, or a generalization of existing ones, when the cause found
by the computer does not coincide with the cause found by the human reader.
Learning algorithms could be adapted in order to help the elicitation of norms. But
the validation of the norms by an expert would remain compulsory, so at the end,
we would have a semi-automatic method to extract norms from texts.
But the important issue is not only the success or failure of getting this work
done more or less automatically. We already have good reasons to believe that the
domain of road accident is explainable by a limited number of norms, and that
a relatively small number of rules is enough to find which ones among them are
violated. We will thus try to apply a similar methodology to other domains, by
asking experts what they perceive to be causes of anomalies, since this seems to be
a good way to elicit the norms.
t may turn out that the number of norms in various fields is not as formidable
as one could think. And representing the norms is of paramount importance to
extend the inference capabilities far beyond what is warranted by truth-conditional
semantics, so our approach could help in lifting a major bottleneck for A.I. Another
possibly fruitful idea would be to classify texts by the norms they are referring to,
because it might open interesting tracks for indexing documents.
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Appendix A. The “Kernel”
Layer 1 contains 7 reified predicates. 5 of them have a pair ¡vehicle, state¿ as argu-
ments: Stopped, Starts, Runs slowly, Runs backwards, Control; all of them express
that the vehicle satisfies the named property during the time interval corresponding
to the given state. The last two predicates are: Changes speed (first argument is
’+’ or ’-’ depending on whether the driver speeds up or brakes, the two remaining
arguments as before) and Abnormal-Perturbation (name of the disruptive factor,
vehicle, state). The whole set of predicates and rules of layers 1 and 2 can be found
in 18.
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